153,420 euros wired to five Italian bank accounts through the Activinv platform, which Consob had already blocked: today the account holders are on trial. If it happened to you too, write to us through the form at the bottom of the page.
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Activinv is a scam, but it is not yet another story of money vanishing overseas. In this case the money ended up in five Italian bank accounts held by identifiable individuals and companies, and the Italian Public Prosecutor brought criminal charges against the holders of those accounts. The file, which our team is following, shows exactly where the protection system worked, where it failed and what room for manoeuvre the injured party still has today: a saver in his late sixties who, between November 2024 and February 2025, wired 153,420 euros to the platform w-trader.activinv.com believing he was investing.
Let us say it straight away, because everything else depends on it: the people on trial are not the masterminds of the fraud, but the so-called front men. And it is precisely on this ground that the battle for compensation is fought.
How the Activinv scam worked: from the fake broker to the borrowed account
The hook: a sponsored ad, a secretary and a broker with a foreign name
It all started in November 2024 with an online ad promising high returns from trading. The victim called the number shown and was answered by a self-styled «Emma», presented as the secretary of a team of brokers who used the name of a genuinely authorised European investment firm with no connection whatsoever to the facts. This is the so-called clone firm scheme: the reputation of a regulated firm is exploited to lower the investor's guard.
A few days later the «broker» appeared: a man with a French name calling from several Italian mobile numbers. The script was a well-rehearsed one: cryptocurrencies, shares and commodities, technical analysis, positions opened and closed within a few hours. Before starting, the broker asked for two things that on their own should have rung alarm bells: a copy of the victim's identity document and the installation of AnyDesk, software that allows a device to be controlled remotely.
The Activinv dashboard: only gains, never withdrawals
The victim was registered on w-trader.activinv.com. The first transfer was just 250 euros; then the amounts grew, supported by a dashboard showing ever-increasing profits and by an intense WhatsApp exchange with the victim's daughter, whom the fake adviser involved to win the trust of the whole family.
In April 2025 the withdrawal request was refused with confused explanations. An in-person meeting was arranged for Easter Saturday and cancelled at the last minute with the excuse of a car accident. Then silence. Recent Italian case law reads this sequence as a single fraudulent course of conduct: according to the Italian Supreme Court (Cass. pen., Sez. II, n. 5191/2026), a fraud is to be regarded as one of «prolonged consummation» when the deception continues precisely to prevent its discovery and to obtain further payments. The fictitious profits shown on the Activinv dashboard are not a piece of stage scenery: they are an integral part of the deception, with direct consequences on when the offence is completed and on the limitation period.
Behind the Activinv domain: an English company that lasted four months
The OSINT analysis attached to the criminal complaint reconstructed the technical architecture of the scam. The WHOIS data of the domain were hidden behind an anonymisation service; the registration history, however, traced the domain back to an English company incorporated in April 2024 and dissolved in August of the same year, registered at a virtual office in Manchester shared with dozens of other businesses. The email domain used by the broker was already offline too. This is the typical structure of fake online trading: disposable corporate vehicles created to last as long as a single campaign.
The fact that weighs most: Consob had already blocked Activinv in December 2024
By resolution no. 23362 of 10 December 2024, Consob, the Italian financial markets authority, ordered the blocking of the website activmarkets-it.com and of the related pages clientarea.activinv.com and webtrader.activinv.com, classifying the activity as the unauthorised provision of investment services to the Italian public.
Comparing the payment receipts with that date reveals the bitterest fact in the file. Before the resolution the victim had paid 49,600 euros. Afterwards, he paid another 103,820 euros: two thirds of the total loss. The Activinv scam shows a structural limit of website blocking: the block works through internet service providers, takes a few days to become effective and, above all, does not reach people who are already «hooked». To receive a bank transfer, a fraudster does not need a reachable website: an IBAN and a WhatsApp conversation are enough. Moreover, the victim was using a subdomain different from those listed in the order, a sign that address variants are a predictable countermeasure.
The practical lesson is simple and worth repeating: checking the warnings published by the regulator is not something you do once, at the beginning, but before every new payment.
Where the money went: five Italian accounts, no offshore haven
The Activinv transfers did not go abroad. They were credited to accounts held at Italian banks, at Poste Italiane and at an EU payment institution operating in Italy through a branch. The payees included private individuals and a company in the car sector, with generic payment references such as «invoice deposit».
This contradicts the common belief that the money lost in a trading scam is by definition out of reach. Customer due diligence obligations under Italian anti-money-laundering law (Legislative Decree no. 231/2007) allow the judicial authorities to trace who opened the accounts: this is exactly what enabled the prosecutor to put a name to the five account holders.
There is, however, a flip side. The Verification of Payee introduced by Regulation (EU) 2024/886, in operation since October 2025, would not have stopped these transfers: the service checks that the payee's name matches the IBAN, and here it did. That is precisely what a money mule is for: providing a «clean» account in the name of a real person, which passes every formal check.
The recall nobody asked for
In the out-of-court phase, formal demand letters were sent to the institutions that received the money. The reply of the payment institution that had received 49,320 euros is instructive. The account had already been suspended by the institution on 3 January 2025, following the first reports from the authorities, and the remaining funds were then frozen by order of the judicial authority. The institution stressed, however, that no recall request had ever been received from the customer's bank and that the demand letter arrived more than six months after the transfers. Referring to the Italian banking ombudsman's case law, it recalled that under SEPA rules a fraud recall must be triggered within ten business days of execution.
The legal framework leaves little room for actions against intermediaries: Article 24 of Legislative Decree no. 11/2010 treats a payment made in accordance with the unique identifier as correctly executed, and banks rely on it systematically. This does not mean that the intermediary's liability is always excluded, but reaction time affects the outcome far more than people think.
From the complaint to the summons: seventeen months and a charge to be read carefully
The criminal complaint was filed in May 2025, together with the OSINT report and a request for the preventive seizure of the accounts. Territorial jurisdiction was established at the place of the first credit, applying the principle that, in a fraud committed by bank transfer, the offence is completed where the offender obtains the unlawful profit and not where the victim gives the payment order (Cass. pen., Sez. I, n. 21357/2021), read together with the rules on connected proceedings (Articles 12 and 16 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure).
In October 2026 the prosecutor issued a direct summons to trial under Articles 550 and 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the five account holders, each charged under Articles 110 and 640 of the Italian Criminal Code with having received, in complicity with others, the sums credited to his own account: 250 euros, 49,350 euros, 25,000 euros, 29,500 euros and 49,320 euros. Two defendants are charged as repeat offenders, a third as a specific repeat offender within five years. The pre-trial hearing has been set for autumn 2027. Between the discovery of the Activinv scam and the first hearing about two and a half years will have passed: a timeframe that must be taken into account from the very beginning.
What is missing from the charge
The charge is one of simple fraud. It contains neither the aggravating circumstances requested in the complaint nor those introduced in the meantime by the legislator. Law no. 90/2024, in force since 17 July 2024, added to Article 640(2)(2-ter) of the Criminal Code the aggravating circumstance of fraud «committed at a distance through computer or telematic tools capable of hindering one's own or others' identification»; Decree-Law no. 48/2025, converted by Law no. 80/2025, then removed point 2-bis and moved the «reduced defence» aggravating circumstance (Article 61(5)) to the third paragraph, with harsher penalties and prosecution ex officio. The Supreme Court has clarified that there is legislative continuity between the various versions and that the 2-ter aggravating circumstance remains prosecutable only upon complaint (Cass. pen., Sez. II, nos. 8644/2026 and 27907/2026).
The facts of the Activinv scam took place after July 2024 and the way they were carried out (contacts exclusively by phone and online, phone lines registered to third parties, a hidden domain) matches the statutory description perfectly. Add to this the aggravating circumstance of financial damage of significant seriousness under Article 61(7), hard to dispute for individual credits close to 50,000 euros, and unauthorised financial activity under Article 166 of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, also mentioned in the complaint.
This choice is not without consequences: it affects the range of penalties, the limitation period and the negotiating weight of the injured party. Article 554-bis(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the judge at the pre-trial hearing, also at the request of the parties, to invite the prosecutor to align the facts, legal classification and aggravating circumstances with what emerges from the file. It is a space the civil party's lawyer must occupy.
The «I didn't know» defence and the weight of receiving the profit
Charging complicity in fraud, rather than money laundering, moves the heart of the trial to the causal contribution and the state of mind of the account holders. Here 2026 case law offers a relevant argument: according to Cass. pen., Sez. II, n. 15091/2026, once it is proven that the defendant received the proceeds of the fraud, receipt of the unlawful profit is evidence, not a mere clue, that the conduct is attributable to him; it is then up to the defence to put forward a concrete alternative explanation, not a merely hypothetical one.
Charges «per account»: the risk of fragmenting compensation
Each defendant answers only for the amount that passed through his own account. Separate charges are consistent with the available evidence, but they have a practical effect the injured party must be aware of: compensation orders are likely to follow the same split, tying the recovery of the capital to the solvency of five separate estates. For the victim of the Activinv scam, a defendant who received 250 euros and one who received 49,350 euros are not the same thing.
The pre-trial hearing: the real turning point for the injured party
For offences tried on direct summons, the Cartabia reform introduced a filter hearing before a single judge (Articles 554-bis and 554-ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure). For the victim of the Activinv scam it is the decisive moment, for three reasons.
The deadline to join as a civil party is final
Under the reformed Article 79 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in proceedings on direct summons the injured party must join as a civil party before the checks on the appearance of the parties at the pre-trial hearing are completed (Article 554-bis(2)). After that point, joining is no longer admissible. A separate civil action remains possible, but the synergy with the criminal proceedings is lost, together with the possibility of requesting in that forum a conservatory seizure of the defendants' assets under Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The filter is decided on the file
The judge dismisses the case when the evidence gathered does not allow a reasonable prediction of conviction. In judgment no. 58/2026 the Italian Constitutional Court held that it is legitimate for the judge not to have investigative powers at this stage: the decision is based on the file. The quality of the complaint, the receipts and the technical analysis filed by the injured party therefore becomes decisive.
Alternative procedures and reparative conduct: the negotiating lever
At the same hearing the defendants may request a summary trial, a plea bargain or probation, which presupposes, where possible, compensation for the damage (Article 168-bis of the Criminal Code). Since simple fraud is prosecutable only upon complaint, withdrawal of the complaint and extinction of the offence through reparative conduct under Article 162-ter of the Criminal Code also come into play; the latter requires full compensation before the trial opens. For the victim of the Activinv scam these are double-edged tools: they can lead to a quick refund, but they must be handled with care, because the judge may declare the offence extinguished even on the basis of a formal offer the victim has refused, if the judge considers it adequate.
In parallel, a civil action for restitution of undue payment against the account holders remains available, and in several cases it has proved faster than the criminal trial.
Three mistakes that, in the Activinv scam, cost more than the transfers
The first mistake was handing over an identity document and remote access to the device. AnyDesk and similar tools have no role whatsoever in a legitimate investment relationship.
The second was continuing to pay after Consob had ordered the blocking of the site. A check before each transfer would have avoided losses of more than one hundred thousand euros.
The third was time. The months between the last transfer and the formal steps taken with the institutions closed the recall window, which is measured in business days.
One more warning applies to anyone who has suffered the Activinv scam: after the loss, offers often arrive from self-styled recovery companies or fake lawyers asking for an advance to «unlock» the funds. It is the so-called recovery room, a second scam built on top of the first, like the one we described in the case of the fake fund-recovery investigators. No serious professional guarantees recovery. The clone firm technique used at the start is the same one we analysed in the article on the clone of an authorised firm.
What to do if you sent money to Activinv or similar platforms
The following points do not replace an assessment of your specific case, but they set out the priorities:
- keep everything: transfer receipts, chats, phone numbers, web addresses, screenshots of the platform dashboard;
- contact your bank immediately and formally request the recall of the most recent transfers;
- file a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor within three months of discovering the facts (Article 124 of the Italian Criminal Code), requesting the seizure of the funds and attaching every element useful for IP and bank tracing;
- check whether proceedings concerning the same platform are already open: scams of this kind almost always involve several victims and accounts already known to the authorities;
- if the prosecutor brings charges, do not miss the deadline to join as a civil party;
- assess with a lawyer a parallel civil action against the account holders and protective measures on their assets.
The legal framework for online trading fraud is changing quickly: between 2024 and 2025 the Italian legislator amended Article 640 of the Criminal Code twice, and the Supreme Court continues to define its scope. For anyone who has suffered the Activinv scam or similar schemes, acting promptly and with a consistent strategy across criminal and civil proceedings is what separates a file destined for dismissal from a trial with real prospects of compensation.
Were you a victim of the Activinv scam or of fake online trading? Fill in the form at the bottom of the page
If you sent transfers to Activinv, to accounts indicated by a self-styled broker or to trading platforms that do not let you withdraw, AvvocatoPenalistaH24 can analyse your documents, reconstruct the payment trail and assess with you the criminal and civil actions available. Fill in the form at the bottom of this page, giving the dates and amounts of your payments: our team will contact you for an initial assessment of your case.
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