blazoncommunity.com is a scam: 10% on mining, a recruitment compensation plan and a company dissolved in 2026

Please note: we are a law firm that deals exclusively with online investment fraud and unauthorised financial activity. This article is based on a real case handled by the firm and is published in anonymised form as regards the victim, in the public interest. The company data reported here is taken from public registers anyone can consult. If you recognise your own situation in what follows, you can submit your case using the form at the bottom of this page.

The company named in the footer of the blazoncommunity.com site was dissolved on 14 April 2026. The site is still online today, and every page still displays that company's name, its London address and its registration number. blazoncommunity.com is a scam which, whatever else may be said, is soliciting the public in the name of a legal entity that no longer exists. It is a fact anyone can verify in thirty seconds, and it is the right place to start.

Why blazoncommunity.com is a scam: what the UK register says

The site of blazoncommunity.com presents itself as the expression of "Blazon Social Job Community Ltd", a company incorporated under English law with a stated address in Devonshire Street, London, and registration number 10626060. That number is the key to the United Kingdom's public companies register, and the register answers with four pieces of information worth reading one at a time.

First: the company behind blazoncommunity was incorporated on 17 February 2017. It is therefore real, or at least it was: this is not an invented name.

Second, and decisive: the company status is "Dissolved", with effect from 14 April 2026. A company struck off the register no longer exists as a legal person. It cannot enter into contracts, cannot receive money, cannot hold rights. Yet the blazoncommunity platform continues to operate and continues to name that very company as its operator.

Third: the last accounts filed by the blazoncommunity company are made up to 29 February 2024, and the last confirmation statement dates from January 2024. After that date the company stops meeting its filing obligations, which is what typically precedes being struck off. In other words: while the network was still taking sign-ups and payments, the corporate vehicle was already winding down.

Fourth, and the most underestimated. The nature of business declared on the register carries SIC code 63990, "other information service activities not elsewhere classified". That is not a financial code. Not intermediation, not portfolio management, not payment services, not exchange activity. The company that for years collected money promising returns from mining had told its own national register that it was in information services.

This closes any discussion about blazoncommunity at the outset: we are not looking at an authorised operator that overstepped, but at an entity that never even claimed to carry on the activity it was in fact carrying on. Anyone looking today for confirmation that blazoncommunity is a scam does not need an expert report: they need a free look at a public register.

"50% of margins shared across the network": the compensation plan is the offence

On the blazoncommunity site the structure is described without reticence, and that frankness is what makes it usable.

The blazoncommunity site states that the platform "allows its Promoters to enter its business by sharing all profits generated", that "no other competitor in the world allows this", and that "50% of Blazon's real margins are divided across the whole network according to the rules of the Compensation Plan". You join by registering "with the Network" and choosing "to become one of our Promoters". The path is explicit: train, become a Promoter, start earning, build your success.

This is not the sale of a product to an end consumer. It is entry into a network, remunerated under a compensation plan, where each person's economic position depends on the network they build beneath them. The victim in our file summed it up in one sentence: the scheme promised periodic earnings, and if you invited a friend you earned more.

That is precisely the conduct prohibited by Italian law no. 173 of 17 August 2005. Articles 5 and 6 of that statute prohibit promoting or operating sales structures in which participants' primary economic incentive rests on the mere recruitment of new members rather than on their ability to sell goods or services to end consumers, and impose criminal penalties on those who promote or operate them.

The technical point matters, because complaints almost always omit it: a breach of law 173/2005 does not require proof of individual deception. There is no need to show that a particular member was misled. It is enough to prove the structure: a compensation plan, remuneration tied to recruitment, no external end market. And in the case of blazoncommunity, that structure is described by the site itself.

The blazoncommunity 10% on "server-mining hire" and a currency that only works in-house

The blazoncommunity yield mechanism is set out in the metadata of the main blazoncommunity.com page: "server-mining" produces digital money called blazon, with a 10% commission over a minimum of three months and a maximum of one year; the digital money earned can then be exchanged on the company's own "Buy&Sell" platform into euros, pounds sterling or dollars, or reinvested in further server-mining hires.

The architecture of the blazoncommunity artifice is concentrated here, and it is worth taking apart.

The return promised by blazoncommunity is stated and predetermined: 10%. Not an estimate, not a range tied to market performance: a fixed percentage over a fixed horizon. No real mining operation produces a predetermined return, because the outcome depends on network difficulty, energy prices and the price of the mined asset, all variables outside the operator's control. A fixed percentage does not describe a productive activity: it describes a promise.

The return is denominated in an instrument issued by the operator itself. The "blazon" is not a cryptocurrency traded on third-party markets: it is an internal unit of account. Its value is not formed by supply and demand on an independent trading venue; it is set by whoever issues it.

Conversion takes place on a platform belonging to the same company. This is the decisive point. As long as the gain stays inside the circuit it is not a gain: it is an entry in the ledger of the party that took the money. The moment of truth is the exit, and the exit is controlled by the same party that controlled the entry. That is the structural reason why, in every scheme of this type, the balance grows until you ask for it.

Reinvestment of blazon "in further server-mining hires" closes the loop: the system encourages you never to exit, because each renewal postpones the moment you discover the exit does not work.

A "proprietary" and "centralised" blockchain: in other words, a database

There is also an internal contradiction on the blazoncommunity site worth isolating, because it is the kind a court-appointed expert appreciates.

The site states that it has "developed a proprietary Blockchain" and uses "servers decentralised in various parts of the world". A few lines further down, in the mining section, it says it has invested "in mining facilities, centralising our Blockchain".

Decentralised and centralised, on the same page. This is not a question of wording. A proprietary blockchain, centralised and run by a single party, is not a blockchain in the technical sense: it is a database administered by its owner, who can write to it, alter it and reset it. Telling a user that their balance is "on the blockchain", evoking immutability and verifiability, when that ledger is a private database, is exactly the representation of a non-existent fact required by art. 640 of the Italian Criminal Code.

Alongside this, blazoncommunity lists heterogeneous verticals — Spend, Shop, WebMail, WebRadio, and in its keywords a holiday arm and a radio station. In these schemes the multiplication of business lines does not serve diversification: it provides a narrative justification for the continuous inflow of money.

Recruitment to blazoncommunity inside a hierarchical structure

The blazoncommunity file has a feature that deserves separate analysis, because it is what distinguishes this case from ordinary online fraud.

The victim did not reach blazoncommunity through an advertisement or an anonymous message. He was introduced to the circuit by a hierarchical superior within the organised body in which he serves, and reports that numerous colleagues, including senior ones, were brought in through that same chain. The initial contact therefore did not take place in the open space of the internet but inside a closed community, with a formal hierarchy and a relationship of subordination.

This produces three legal consequences in the blazoncommunity case.

The first concerns the aggravating circumstance under art. 61 no. 11 of the Criminal Code, which increases the penalty where the offence is committed through abuse of authority or of office relationships. Where the person proposing membership exercises hierarchical powers over the recipient, or a position of authority deriving from office, trust is not the product of a free assessment: it is a function of the structure. The circumstance must be expressly pleaded, because it is not applied of the court's own motion and because, as we shall see, it affects prosecutability.

The second concerns impaired defence under art. 61 no. 5, incorporated by art. 640(2)(2-bis). In a closed community, critical scrutiny is structurally inhibited: to doubt the proposal is to doubt the person bringing it, and that person is a superior or a long-standing colleague. It is why frauds exploiting group membership — professional, religious, local — achieve participation rates no advertising campaign reaches.

The third runs the other way, and must be stated frankly, because it is in the reader's interest.

Anyone who brought others in has a position to protect

In the blazoncommunity compensation-plan structure, a member who invites others and derives an economic benefit from their entry objectively takes on the role of promoter of the structure. Article 5 of law 173/2005 does not punish only those who organise the top: it punishes whoever promotes or operates the activity.

This means that a significant proportion of the people involved in blazoncommunity are at once victims and potential suspects. The position is resolved on the subjective side — awareness of the fraudulent nature of the structure — but that is established in the proceedings, not before.

The operational corollary is clear. Anyone who paid money and also introduced others should not attend an interview without counsel. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires an authority receiving statements that disclose evidence of the declarant's own criminal involvement to stop the examination, warn them and invite them to appoint a lawyer, with the statements already made unusable; and if the person should have been heard as a suspect from the outset, their statements are wholly unusable. In these files the order in which steps are taken matters as much as their content.

It should be added that anyone who sent the structure an identity document, a tax code and a personal photograph — as happened in our file — is also exposed to the risk that those data will be used to open accounts in their name, with the attendant risk of being asked to explain other people's money passing through them.

Legal classification and the problem of time

The conduct attributable to blazoncommunity involves, in our view, several concurrent criminal offences.

Fraud under art. 640 of the Criminal Code, in its contractual form: the artifices are the representation of a mining operation producing a predetermined return, the description of a private, centralised ledger as a blockchain, and the display of a balance in an internal currency convertible only with the issuer.

Breach of law 173/2005 on pyramid selling, for the recruitment-based compensation plan.

Unauthorised financial activity under art. 166 TUF and breach of the reservation on taking deposits from the public under art. 130 TUB: collecting money from the public against the prospect of a return is a reserved activity, and no authorisation appears in the name of the entity shown on the site, which in fact declared an information-services business to its register.

For conduct in 2022 and 2023 a further point applies: operating as a virtual-currency service provider towards the Italian public already then required registration with the competent body under anti-money-laundering rules, and providing the service without that registration is separately sanctioned.

Why paragraph 2-ter does not apply to this case

Rigour is needed on the blazoncommunity file, because the opposite error is as damaging as an omission.

Art. 640(2-ter), which aggravates fraud committed remotely through computer means capable of hindering identification, was introduced by law 90/2024. The payments in question fall in 2022 and 2023, before that reform entered into force. Under art. 2 of the Criminal Code that circumstance cannot be pleaded for these facts.

Pleading it anyway, as one sometimes reads in mass-produced filings, is counterproductive: it exposes the complaint to an immediate objection and undermines the credibility of the whole case. For this period the circumstances to plead are those of art. 61 nos. 5 and 11 and, where applicable, substantial financial loss under art. 61 no. 7.

Limitation runs faster than you think

This is what makes the blazoncommunity file urgent, and it is counter-intuitive.

On the blazoncommunity fraud count, time is not yet the problem: the limitation period under art. 157 is not less than six years from completion, with subsequent interrupting acts.

But the breach of law 173/2005 is punished by detention or a fine and is therefore a contravvenzione, a minor offence: its limitation period is four years. For conduct in 2022 that period is close to expiry or, depending on the moment of completion, may already have passed.

The practical consequence is that the count easiest to prove — the one that does not require proof of individual deception but only of the structure — is also the first to die. Anyone who waits longer risks reaching the filing stage with fraud alone, and therefore with the heaviest evidential burden.

As to the criminal complaint, the three-month deadline under art. 124 has, for 2022-2023 conduct, almost certainly expired as regards simple fraud. What saves the position is prosecution ex officio flowing from the circumstances in art. 640(2), together with the ex officio prosecutability of unauthorised financial activity and of the breach of law 173/2005, neither of which is subject to any complaint deadline.

Transfers to the UK: after Brexit the European Investigation Order does not apply

The payments documented in the blazoncommunity file were made to the United Kingdom, and this calls for a clarification that affects timing.

Until the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, obtaining banking documentation from British institutions went through the European Investigation Order under legislative decree 108/2017. That is no longer the case. The United Kingdom is a third country, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters rests on the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and on the dedicated provisions of the EU-UK partnership agreement.

This is not an academic difference: it changes the instrument to be drafted, the authority to be addressed and, above all, the timescale, which lengthens considerably. A complaint asking generically for "activation of the EIO" against a British institution contains a technical error the prosecutor's office will have to correct, with the delay that entails.

A dissolved company: what it really means for recovery

The dissolution of the British company behind blazoncommunity on 14 April 2026 has effects that must be understood, because they determine strategy.

On the civil side, a company struck off the register cannot be sued. The residual assets of a company dissolved in the United Kingdom pass to the Crown as bona vacantia. To proceed against the entity you must first obtain its restoration to the register, through administrative restoration or a court order: a technical step, possible, but one to be factored in for time and cost.

On the criminal side, dissolution is irrelevant. Criminal liability is personal: those who actually organised, promoted and ran the structure are liable, not the corporate vehicle. Striking off the company extinguishes no offence and does not prevent seizure of the funds wherever they are. Indeed, winding up the vehicle in the middle of ongoing operations is itself a factor the judicial authority will weigh.

And the most relevant fact for the reader remains: the blazoncommunity site is still operating. That means there is, today, a live infrastructure, a registered and renewed domain, hosting, mailboxes and a login panel. These are all elements the judicial authority can secure now and which, unlike the accounts, have not yet been dispersed.

What to secure immediately

The list is operational and, for anyone who joined blazoncommunity, must be carried out before anything else.

Full capture of the site's pages, including those reachable after logging in, with date and time: in particular the page describing the compensation plan, the mining page and the footer showing the company name and registration number. An extract of the UK public companies register for the named company, showing the dissolved status and the date. Registry attestations for the domain. Native export of every conversation with whoever proposed membership and with the network's representatives, preserving the original file and not a printout. Records of all transfers, with complete beneficiary details, IBAN, BIC and country. Any contracts, certificates and presentation material received. Screenshots of the member area showing balances in the internal currency and every withdrawal or conversion attempt, especially refused or unanswered ones.

On that basis a complaint is drafted pleading aggravated fraud under art. 640(2)(2-bis) with the circumstances of art. 61 nos. 5 and 11, breach of law 173/2005 and unauthorised financial activity under art. 166 TUF, with applications for banking enquiries and seizure under arts. 253 and 321, and the correct cooperation instrument identified for each foreign beneficiary.

Two final warnings, which apply to the blazoncommunity file as to every case of this type. First: do not tell the other side you have instructed a lawyer — the channel closes and the accounts are emptied. Second: collective initiatives have reportedly already been launched by other members. Joining someone else's initiative does not replace your own position: the reconstruction of the flows has to be done payment by payment, and anyone who files nothing acquires no right over sums seized in someone else's proceedings.

Related cases handled by the firm

Readers who recognise their own case may find useful our analyses of HyperCommunity and the daily-return Ponzi scheme, which shares with blazoncommunity the non-existent mining and the compensation-plan network, sistemascientifico.com and the Profitto Scientifico funnel, fundinves.com and unauthorised financial activity and money entrusted to an acquaintance.

If you joined blazoncommunity: what to do now

The picture is this. blazoncommunity is a scam in so far as it promises a predetermined 10% return on a mining operation, denominates that return in a currency it issues itself and allows conversion only on its own platform; in so far as members are remunerated under a compensation plan based on recruitment; in so far as it calls "blockchain" a ledger it states on the same page it has centralised; and in so far as the legal entity shown on the site was dissolved on 14 April 2026, after declaring to its register that it was in information services.

Time here works against you twice: because the accounts are being emptied, and because the count that is easiest to prove expires in four years.

Our firm has already handled this case. If you joined the network, bought server-mining hires, see a balance in internal currency you cannot convert, or introduced other people and fear you have exposed yourself, you can submit your position for a preliminary assessment.

If you have suffered the same fraud, we can help you. Fill in the form at the bottom of this page.