We have already handled this case. A domain registered on 13 March 2026, today suspended by its registrar, built by adding a prefix to the name of an authorised payment institution that has nothing to do with it. If you have suffered the same scam, we can help you: fill in the form at the bottom of this page.
A premise: we are a law firm and we deal exclusively with online fraud and unauthorised financial activity. This article comes from a real case handled by the firm and is published in anonymous form as regards the injured party, for public interest purposes. The technical data come from checks on the public domain registries carried out on the date of publication. If you recognise yourself in what you read, you can submit your position to us using the form at the bottom of this page.
The injured party in this file had already been defrauded once, on a trading and cryptocurrency platform. Then came the worse part: a self-styled fund recovery company, presenting itself under the name of a genuine, authorised payment institution.
The money paid to "recover" the money already lost thus went out through a second channel, and the total of the affair reached around twenty thousand euro.
eu-ecommbx.com is a scam, our firm has already handled this case, and this article explains how to recognise a clone of an authorised institution before paying — with a check that takes two minutes and is free.
Why eu-ecommbx.com is a scam: ten years against three weeks
Let us start with the checks on the public domain registries, which anybody can repeat.
eu-ecommbx.com is registered on 13 March 2026, for one year, with a foreign registrar, resting on parking name servers and with no mail configured at all. The injured party's last payment dates from April 2026: the domain was created a few weeks before it was needed, the way a disposable tool is bought.
And there is one fact that weighs more than any other: eu-ecommbx.com is today suspended by its registrar. In registry language this is a state the provider imposes on a domain name to stop it working, and in practice it is a measure that follows abuse reports. It is not one party's opinion: it is a position taken by the operator that sold that name.
Now the comparison. The domain of the authentic institution whose name was used is registered in 2016, with the registration already paid up to 2033, resting on a corporate mail and management infrastructure, and protected by all the security locks the registry makes available to prevent unauthorised transfers or changes.
Ten years of history and an expiry seven years away, against a name born three weeks before the last transfer and already switched off.
It must be said clearly, because it is the point that also protects the reader: the authentic institution has nothing to do with any of this. It is an authorised and supervised electronic money institution, and it is itself an injured party of the improper use of its own name. Whoever built eu-ecommbx.com simply took an existing, trusted name and stuck it on a domain of their own.
The prefix trick
In the eu-ecommbx.com case there is a detail worth isolating, because it is the heart of the deception and repeats identically in dozens of cases.
The name of eu-ecommbx.com is not an invented name: it is the authentic institution's name with a prefix in front. In this case "eu-", which evokes Europe, the European Union, a continental branch, something institutional.
That prefix means nothing. Anybody can register a domain by adding "eu-", "it-", "secure-", "my-" or "official-" in front of the name of a bank, a payment institution or an authority, and the domain will be theirs, not the institution's. The same goes for suffixes: changing the final extension — .online, .group, .co, .vip — requires no authorisation and certifies nothing.
In the file, indeed, three domains were used, all built on the same name: eu-ecommbx.com and two others with different extensions, registered within a few weeks of each other, all with a one-year term and all suspended today.
A methodological clarification is needed here, because wrong arguments circulate about such links. The three domains share name servers, but these are the provider's default parking name servers, used by an enormous number of wholly unrelated customers: on their own they prove nothing, and a filing resting on that datum would be fragile. What really links them is something else, and it is far more solid: the same usurped name, the same provider, consecutive registration dates, the same one-year term, the same outcome of suspension — and above all the fact, documented in the file, that the same person was taken onto all three within the same affair.
How to verify an institution, in two minutes
This is the part to keep, so as not to repeat the eu-ecommbx.com experience; it applies to any site presenting itself as a bank, payment institution, electronic money institution or investment firm.
First: you do not verify the name, you verify the address. The name of an authorised institution can be written by anybody, on any page. What cannot be faked is the website address published by the supervisory authority in its own register. You open the authority's register, look up the institution, and compare the address shown there with that of the page you are about to pay money to. If they differ by even one character — a prefix, a hyphen, a different extension — it is not the same entity.
Second: the age of the domain. In the eu-ecommbx.com case, looking at that alone was enough. An authorised institution has been operating for years and has a domain that is years old. A name registered a few weeks ago, with a one-year term, is nobody's European branch.
Third: the mail. A real institution has mailboxes on its own domain. A clone, almost always, has no mail record configured at all: it writes from free addresses or from domains different from the site's.
Fourth, and decisive: no authorised institution contacts a fraud victim first, offering to recover their money for a fee. It is not their business, it is not covered by their licence, and they do not do it. Whoever does is not an institution.
Why fund recovery is the ground of the second scam
In the eu-ecommbx.com file the dynamic is the classic one and deserves describing, because it is the reason these sites exist.
Anyone who has already suffered a scam like the eu-ecommbx.com one ends up on lists that circulate and are sold. From those lists come the later approaches: a company that says it has located the lost sums, that has the means to bring them back, that asks only for expenses to be covered. From there on it is a second stream of payments, added to the first.
In the eu-ecommbx.com file the mechanism works because it plays on something very human: the chance to put right a mistake. And it works even better when whoever proposes the recovery has a name that, when searched, returns a real and authorised institution.
The practical rule eu-ecommbx.com teaches is a single one: nobody recovers money by asking for money up front. A professional invoices for their own work; they do not ask you to pay sums to third parties to unlock a balance that does not exist. And an Italian lawyer is entered in a Bar roll, an entry publicly verifiable in two minutes — a check that should always be done, with us too.
The legal framework
In the eu-ecommbx.com file there are two matters to be set out in the same filing, not one.
The first fraud, on the trading and cryptocurrency platform, and the second fraud, that of the fake fund recovery, which is a separate offence and must be charged as such. In practice the second is often the more attackable, because it is more recent and the payments are easier to follow.
Article 640 of the criminal code applies, with the aggravating circumstances of diminished defence under article 61 no. 5 recalled by article 640 paragraph 2 no. 2-bis and of damage of particular seriousness under article 61 no. 7; for facts after July 2024, also article 640 paragraph 2-ter, introduced by law 90/2024, which aggravates fraud committed remotely with computer tools capable of hindering identification of the perpetrator.
Also relevant is impersonation under article 494, because using the name of an authorised institution to induce payment is precisely the attribution to oneself of a false name and a false capacity. Whoever presents themselves as a lawyer without being one also answers for unlawful exercise of a profession under article 348. Unauthorised financial activity under article 166 of the Consolidated Law on Finance is relevant, prosecutable of the court's own motion. And, as regards the path of the money, money laundering under article 648-bis, to be presented as third parties' conduct.
The aggravating circumstances of the second paragraph of article 640 entail prosecution of the court's own motion: the three-month complaint deadline is not an insurmountable obstacle. But the domains used are already suspended, and the data concerning them can be obtained only while the operators keep them: that is a serious reason not to wait.
What to secure immediately
Anyone who paid money to eu-ecommbx.com must obtain: the complete bank statement in official form, outgoing and incoming, with ordering party, beneficiary, IBAN, BIC, country and payment reference for both flows — the one to the original platform and the one to the self-styled recovery company; the native export of all conversations; the emails received in complete original format, not photographed, because the technical headers are needed; the exact addresses of all the domains used, with dates; the names and contact details used by the people you spoke to; copies of any contracts, invoices or letters received; and the list of personal documents handed over.
Similar cases already handled by the firm
Anyone who crossed paths with eu-ecommbx.com will find useful our analysis of manoab.com, a clone of a Lithuanian bank, and of mirabaudasset-management.com, a clone of a Swiss banking group; dam-w24platform.com, with the fake recovery downstream; and, on the broker blocked by the supervisory authority, finomarkets.org. On money entrusted to a self-styled adviser, see our piece on unauthorised financial activity.
If you paid money to eu-ecommbx.com: what to do now
This is the picture. eu-ecommbx.com is a scam: a domain registered on 13 March 2026 with a one-year term, with no mail, today suspended by its registrar, built by adding a prefix to the name of an authorised payment institution that has nothing to do with it and is itself an injured party.
If you are considering a company promising to recover your money, stop on one thing only: the exact address of the site, compared with the one published in the supervisory authority's register. It is free and takes two minutes.
And if you have already paid a self-styled recovery agent, that is a separate fraud: report it too, in the same filing, and it is often the easier of the two to follow.
Our firm has already handled this case. You can submit your position to us for a preliminary assessment.
If you have suffered the same scam, we can help you. Fill in the form you will find at the bottom of this page.
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