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«Gruppo core di trading» is a scam: pump and dump on your own broker account

15 November 2026 · Avvocato Penalista H24

We have already handled this case: 35,000 euros burned in a day. No fake platform — a real bank, a real securities account, real shares. And the first profits were genuine, with the tax paid. If it happened to you, write to us using the form at the bottom of this page.

Please note: we are a law firm and we deal exclusively with online fraud cases. If you would like our help, you can contact us by filling in the form at the bottom of this article.

We have already handled this case and we can help people who fell into the same trap. The «Gruppo core di trading» is a scam: a messaging group handing out stock «signals» which, in the file in front of us, led one person to lose thirty-five thousand euros in a single day.

This case differs from every other one we recount on this site, and it is worth saying at once why.

There is no fake platform. There is no invented trading website, no balance written on a web page, no foreign IBAN in a stranger's name. There is a real Italian bank, a real securities account in the injured party's own name, and real shares, genuinely bought on regulated markets, genuinely held, genuinely taxed.

And that is exactly why it works.

How the «Gruppo core di trading» scam works

The scheme of the «Gruppo core di trading» is known in the trade as ramp and dump: it is inflated and then unloaded. Supervisory authorities across the world have published warnings about it over the past two years, and the sequence is always the same.

First: the invitation. You arrive in a messaging group through a social-media advertisement or an unsolicited invite. The group is full of enthusiastic participants who give thanks, post screenshots of profits and ask intelligent questions. Almost all of them are fake. Inside there is an «analyst» or «mentor» posting the trading instructions.

Second: the trust. The first recommendations concern large, well-known, perfectly respectable stocks. You buy, the stock rises, you sell, you make money. We come back to this shortly, because in our file it is documented in a way that leaves no doubt.

Third: the target. After a few weeks the recommendations move to tiny companies listed on foreign markets — minimal capitalisation and very little trading. You are told to buy, often within a precise time window.

Fourth: the rise. The organisers already hold those shares. The concentrated buying of hundreds of people, in a stock that normally barely trades, pushes the price up. You see it rise and you become convinced the analyst is good.

Fifth: the unloading. At a certain point the organisers sell everything, in a block, into the participants' buying. The price collapses within minutes. Whoever is still in loses almost everything.

In the «Gruppo core di trading» file the last operation burned about 90% of the capital committed, in one day.

In the «Gruppo core di trading» the first profits were real. And the tax was paid

Here we come to the point that makes this fraud more effective than all the others, and which we were able to document on paper.

The file contains a certificate issued by the injured party's bank — the document by which, under the Italian «administered savings» regime, the institution reports the substitute tax withheld on capital gains.

For October 2026 that document lists three sales at a profit: on 8 October, 14 October and 30 October. Three trades closed in profit, on three different stocks, with the 26% tax duly withheld by the bank and paid to the revenue.

Stop and think what that means from the point of view of someone inside it.

We are not talking about a fake balance on a platform. We are talking about real capital gains, credited to a real current account, on which the Italian state collected a real tax. Ask your bank and it confirms it. Ask your accountant and he confirms it.

Anyone, at that point, trusts. And anyone, at that point, raises the stake.

That is why the question «but how could he not notice?» makes no sense in these cases. There was nothing to notice: everything that was verifiable was true.

«Gruppo core di trading»: why no alarm went off

A second reason why this scheme passes unharmed through every defence.

When you send a transfer to a foreign IBAN in a stranger's name, your bank can block it, can call you, can ask for explanations. Since 9 October 2025, on euro transfers, it even warns you if the payee's name does not match the IBAN.

Here nothing is triggered, and not through any fault of the bank: not a euro leaves your assets. The money moves from your current account to your securities account, and becomes shares in your name, held with your own intermediary. To any anti-fraud system, you have made an investment.

What is more, you give the order. The bank executes a customer instruction, as in the case in our file: a market order on Euronext Milan, with the exact time printed on the contract note.

Nobody stole anything from you. They convinced you to buy.

What offence is the «Gruppo core di trading», then?

It is the question everybody asks us, and the answer is: more than one.

Market manipulation. Organising the coordinated purchase of an illiquid stock to drive its price up artificially, and then selling your own shares into it, is market manipulation under article 185 of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, as well as an administrative offence under article 187-ter. This is not a grey area: it is the core of what those provisions punish.

Fraud. The «artifices and deceits» are all there: the group populated by fake profiles, the false claims of expertise, the screenshots of other people's gains, the manufactured urgency of a buying window. The disposal of assets is there. The organisers' unjust profit is there. It is fraud under article 640 of the Italian criminal code, aggravated by the impaired defence of article 61 no. 5, because everything happens at a distance and you can verify nothing about the person opposite.

Unauthorised financial activity. Anyone who, without authorisation, provides investment advice to an Italian public — and giving personalised recommendations on which shares to buy and when is exactly that — commits the offence under article 166 of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance.

The difference from the other frauds we recount is important and must be said honestly: here there is no money to seize in a destination account, because your money did not go to the fraudsters' account, it went to the market. The organisers' profit lies elsewhere: in the shares they sold, through their own accounts, while you were buying. Identifying them is harder, but it is also the kind of investigation for which market supervisory authorities exist, and they talk to each other through international cooperation channels.

The proof against the «Gruppo core di trading» you do not realise you have

This is the useful part, and in this type of fraud it is exceptionally good. Far better than in fake-trading cases.

You have your bank's contract notes, one for each trade, with: the stock, the ISIN code, the execution venue, the quantity, the price, and the exact date and time, to the minute.

You have the export of the group chat, with the date and time of every message.

Put the two side by side and you obtain exactly what an investigation needs: at 13:19 on 26 October I bought this stock, and in the group the instruction to buy it had arrived at 12:4x. Multiplied by hundreds of participants, that comparison is the demonstration of coordinated buying.

So, concretely:

  • export the group chat in full, using the app's export function, before the group is deleted or you are removed from it;
  • export the private chats too, with the «analyst» and the «assistants», who are usually on different numbers;
  • ask your bank for the complete securities account statement and all the contract notes for the trades executed;
  • keep the substitute-tax certificate: it is the document proving that the trades really happened, and when;
  • note the phone numbers they wrote to you from.

A group of this kind is closed, or renamed, within days of the unloading. What you have not exported, you will not recover.

The shares bought have nothing to do with it

We write this plainly, because it matters and because it is fair to those who are blameless.

On the injured party's contract notes appear the names of genuinely listed companies: a solid Italian industrial company, traded on Euronext Milan, and two small companies listed on a United States market.

None of these companies is accused of anything in this article. The shares were bought on the market, by an ordinary investor, through his bank. Issuers do not know who buys their shares and have no relationship with whoever runs a messaging group.

On the contrary: mixing a serious, well-known Italian stock with two foreign micro-caps is part of the technique. The good stock makes the arithmetic add up in the victim's mind; the small one is where the money is made.

If they are writing to you now, after the collapse

In the file, immediately after the crash, a message arrived saying, in substance: the collapse was caused by malicious short selling by certain institutions, we are pursuing their liability, sell this position now and await the compensation plan.

We discuss that message — and why it is the second fraud, built on the first — in a dedicated article.

For now this is enough: do not take trading instructions from the people who caused your loss, and do not pay anything for a «compensation». Before selling or buying anything, speak to your own intermediary or an independent adviser.

Victim of the «Gruppo core di trading»: what to do straight away

Leave the «Gruppo core di trading», or any similar group, only after exporting everything.

Execute no further trades on their instruction, in either direction.

Pay nothing for recoveries, compensation, class actions or «unlocking fees».

Ask your bank for the complete documentation of the securities account.

File the criminal complaint, attaching the contract notes and the exported chat, and ask that it also be sent to the market supervisory authority.

Do not be ashamed. In the file the person writes that he feels foolish. He is not: he checked everything that could be checked, and everything added up.

Similar cases we have handled

A warning that concerns us

We are aware that someone is telephoning defrauded people using the name of our firm. We never call on our own initiative, we do not telephone in the evening or at night, we do not use foreign numbers and we never ask for money over the phone. If you receive a call like that, hang up and write to us through the form on this site.

If it happened to you, write to us

If you are in a messaging group giving you instructions on which shares to buy, if you bought a thinly traded foreign stock on an «analyst's» instruction, or if you found yourself with a position down ninety per cent in a single day, fill in the form at the bottom of this page. Give the name of the group, the dates and times of the purchases and the stocks involved.

The more people come forward about the same group, the more legible the picture becomes: coordinated buying is proved with many orders, not with one. We read every request and we reply.

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