We have already handled a multiiplextrade.com scam case: forty-five thousand euros lost, then a fake anti-fraud authority that pushed other victims' money through his account. He now has two frozen accounts and two sets of enquiries against him. If you were caught by the same scam we can help you.
Note: we are a law firm dealing exclusively with online fraud. If you were caught in the same trap and want help, you can write to us using the form at the bottom of this article.
Why we say multiiplextrade.com is a scam
We have already handled the case of a client who, from the end of 2023, paid forty-five thousand euros into multiiplextrade.com, starting with an advance of two hundred and fifty. His total losses in the affair come to around seventy thousand euros.
That is not why we chose to write this article. We wrote it because this person today, on top of having lost the money, is under investigation, with two bank accounts frozen. And because the way he got there is a mechanism anyone who has suffered a fraud needs to know about before it is proposed to them.
Phase one: the project that does not exist
The opening script of multiiplextrade.com is the usual one. A small first payment, two hundred and fifty euros. A contact presenting himself as a broker who guides each step. A dashboard showing gains and, in the case of multiiplextrade.com, a page simulating confirmations on public ledgers, so as to give the operation an appearance of verifiability.
The bait used on multiiplextrade.com was a supposed investment project tied to Middle Eastern capital, identified by an invented name. It is a device we meet often: a "confidential" project, linked to a rich and distant country, unverifiable and therefore credible. No such project existed.
After months of withdrawal requests to multiiplextrade.com that went nowhere, our client filed a criminal complaint. And it is at that point that the case took the turn that concerns us.
Phase two: the fake anti-fraud authority
At the beginning of 2026, long after the multiiplextrade.com events, he was contacted by someone presenting herself as a consultant of a British authority for combating online fraud, producing documentation attesting to her position.
We put it as bluntly as we can: no public authority, Italian or foreign, contacts citizens to give back money they have lost, none operates through private consultants who telephone or write, and none asks for any advance payment. Anyone doing so is committing an offence, and the documentation they produce is false.
This second fraud, grafted onto multiiplextrade.com, works because it arrives at the moment of maximum vulnerability: the victim has already lost everything, has already reported it, has had no answers, and someone finally tells him the money can be recovered.
Phase three: the account used to pass other people's money
Here we come to the point that gives this article its title.
The supposed consultant obtained remote access to his computer through an ordinary assistance program and had our client operate on a regulated exchange, depositing sums into a wallet in his own name. Because — in her words — what he was paying in was not enough to "unlock" the funds, she "helped" him with third parties' money, sending it to his account by bank transfer.
That money, arriving long after the payments to multiiplextrade.com, was not help. It was money from other frauds, which needed to pass through an account held by a real, clean person before disappearing.
After one of those credits, the originating bank filed a complaint. Our client's second account was frozen. Today two sets of enquiries concern him, one of them on money laundering, and the first account, frozen after his own complaint, has still not been released.
The people who caused him this harm are still active and still calling him.
Why the victim becomes a suspect
In the multiiplextrade.com case it is necessary to explain precisely what happens in legal terms, because this is the part that frightens most and is understood worst.
Money passing through an account and then moved elsewhere amounts, objectively, to the conduct described in article 648-bis of the Italian Criminal Code. Credit institutions, under legislative decree 231/2007, are required to report suspicious transactions: that is exactly what happened, and it is why the accounts were frozen and the names ended up in a file.
The decisive point, however, is another. Money laundering requires intent: only someone who knows they are handling proceeds of crime is punishable. There is no negligent money laundering. Anyone deceived by the staging of an institutional recovery does not have that awareness, and without the mental element the offence does not exist.
From this follows a very concrete practical consequence: the defence of someone in this position is precisely the documentation of the fraud they suffered. The earlier complaint, the conversations with the false consultant, the fake documentation produced to him, the remote access sessions, the fact that the transfers came from people unknown to him: each of these elements shows that he was deceived and not aware. Whoever has not gathered them, by contrast, is left defending himself on his word alone.
The rule that avoids all of this
If there is a single thing to take away from this article on multiiplextrade.com, it is this.
Never let anyone pay money into your account to "unlock", "top up", "reach the threshold" or "complete" an operation, and never transfer money received from third parties on someone else's instructions. There is no legitimate reason for a fund recovery to pass through your current account. If it is proposed to you, that is the moment to break off all contact.
And if it has already happened: do not wait for the bank to notice. Go to a lawyer at once, file a complaint setting out the whole story and lodge all the documentation. The difference between being an injured party and being a suspect, in these cases, is often only a matter of timeliness and of evidence.
The domain no longer exists
Checks on the public registers, run in November 2026, give a clear result: multiiplextrade.com is no longer registered. The name does not exist, and nor does it in the correctly spelled version, without the doubled letter.
That doubling, incidentally, is not a typing slip by whoever bought the domain: it is the same device we meet constantly, a name that sounds professional and differs by one letter from something plausible, enough not to overlap with anything existing and not to be read carefully.
The fact that multiiplextrade.com has vanished erases nothing. The traces remain in the accounts, on the exchanges, in the historical domain records and in the documentation the victim kept. Indeed: precisely because the site can no longer be consulted, the screenshots saved at the time become decisive.
The criminal framework
For phase one on multiiplextrade.com, placed between the end of 2023 and 2024, the charge is fraud under article 640 of the Italian Criminal Code, aggravated under the second paragraph no. 2-bis in relation to article 61 no. 5. It must be made clear — and this is no academic detail — that the paragraph 2-ter aggravating circumstance, introduced by law 90/2024, does not apply to those facts, because they predate its entry into force. Charging an inapplicable circumstance weakens the whole case, and it is a mistake we often see made.
For phase two, that of 2026, the paragraph 2-ter circumstance does apply in full. Alongside it stand impersonation under article 494 for the assumption of a false institutional capacity, unauthorised access to a computer system under article 615-ter for the use of remote control and, where instructions were executed from outside, computer fraud under article 640-ter.
Also to be assessed are the aggravating circumstance of particularly serious financial harm under article 61 no. 7, and, as regards whoever organised the movements of money, money laundering under article 648-bis.
As to tools: banking records can be obtained for ten years under article 119, fourth paragraph, of the Consolidated Banking Law; intermediaries and crypto-asset service providers keep identification data for the same period under legislative decree 231/2007; for anything abroad the tools are the European Investigation Order under legislative decree 108/2017 and preventive seizure under article 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As for the frozen accounts, the route is a reasoned application to the authority conducting the proceedings, accompanied by the documentation showing non-involvement.
What to do now
If you have paid money to multiiplextrade.com, break off all contact with anyone presenting themselves as in charge of a recovery, above all if they invoke the name of a public authority. Do not allow remote access to your computer. Do not accept credits from third parties and never transfer money on anyone's behalf. Gather and keep everything: full conversations, documents produced to you, bank statements, receipts, wallet addresses. If you have already received suspicious credits, go to a lawyer immediately. And do not turn to anyone who contacts you promising immediate recovery in exchange for an advance payment.
We can help you
Our firm deals exclusively with online fraud and has already handled cases entirely comparable to multiiplextrade.com: fake brokers, fake recovery authorities, remote access and accounts frozen after receiving sums belonging to other victims.
If you have paid money to multiiplextrade.com or to a platform working the same way, or if you have found your account frozen after receiving money from strangers, contact us using the form at the bottom of this page: we will review the documents and tell you honestly what concrete prospects exist in your case.
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