AvvocatoPenalista H24
← Blog

Other online scams

appfxpepper.net is a scam: Consob has blocked FXPepper

20 November 2026 · Avvocato Penalista H24

A client paid 61,980 euros into appfxpepper.net, the FXPepper brand. On 9 October 2026 Consob blocked fxpepper.eu and its related page. Both domains share the same anonymous name servers, and the transfers left a bank account opened in the victim's own name.

Please note: we are a law firm that deals exclusively with online fraud. If you would like help, you can contact us by filling in the form at the bottom of this article, and here you can see the cases we have resolved.

appfxpepper.net is a scam: Consob has blocked FXPepper, but the account was already in her name

We have already handled this case. A person came to our firm after paying 61,980 euros, between May and October 2026, into a trading platform reachable at appfxpepper.net and known under the brand FXPepper. She sent us her criminal complaint, the bank transfer receipts and the complete banking file.

This file has something few others have: a public measure issued by an Italian supervisory authority. And it has a second element, less visible but more important for anyone trying to recover their money: the account the funds left from was in the victim's own name, and had been opened on the instructions of the people defrauding her.

The Consob measure

On 9 October 2026 the Italian securities regulator, Consob, announced that it had ordered the blocking of four more websites belonging to unauthorised intermediaries. Among them is FXPepper, with the site fxpepper.eu and the related page portal.fxpepper.eu, blocked for providing investment services and activities without authorisation.

With that measure, the total number of sites blocked by the Authority since July 2019 rose to 1,838.

The fact should be read for what it is: it is not an opinion, not a review, not a forum comment. It is the act by which the Italian supervisory authority establishes that this operator could not offer investment services in Italy, and orders connectivity providers to block it.

Two domains, the same anonymous name servers

The person who contacted us was not operating on fxpepper.eu: she was operating on appfxpepper.net, the address her contact had given her. They might look like two different things. They are not.

We checked both domain names and the result is unambiguous: appfxpepper.net and fxpepper.eu are served by the same three name servers, belonging to a commercial anonymisation service that registers domains in its own name on behalf of the real customer. The technical contact published in both domains' zones is, quite literally, an address stating that no information will be obtained.

The remaining checks complete the picture:

  • appfxpepper.net was registered on 20 May 2026, with a one-year term, through a United States registrar. That is exactly when the events described to us began.
  • In the public certificate transparency logs there are only two entries for that name, both dated 12 and 13 October 2026: that is, in the days immediately following the Consob measure. It is not a coincidence, it is a relocation.
  • Today neither domain resolves: no address records, no mail records, and the subdomain named by Consob no longer exists. Both zones were last modified at the end of October 2026.

Whoever ran appfxpepper.net switched everything off. The brand, however, survived for a few weeks by moving to other addresses: after the blocking order, our client was given fresh credentials on a third address, still under the same commercial name.

What makes this case different: the bank credentials

Here is the part worth explaining in full, because we see it in a growing number of files.

The second contact — a self-styled broker who introduced himself on the phone in a very professional manner, calling first from a British number and later from a Spanish one — did not only give her the platform credentials. He also gave her the details to access an account at a digital bank, opened in her name.

From then on, every transfer left an Italian account properly held by the victim. The platform was also given remote access to her computer, through a very common and entirely legitimate support program.

The practical consequences are three, and it is worth knowing them before discussing matters with your bank:

  • the transactions appear to have been ordered by the account holder, with her credentials and from her device, so anti-fraud systems do not stop them;
  • in a complaint, the bank will object — legitimately, from its own standpoint — that the payments were authorised;
  • the account in the victim's name remains the first link in the chain, and everything that passed through it is attributable to her.

That is why we always say the same things to anyone in this position: close the account opened on the fraudsters' instructions immediately, ask the institution for the complete statement, remove the remote access software and have the computer checked, and ask your bank to run a check in the credit risk registers.

The payees on the receipts are not the platform

We examined the transfer receipts. Not one carries the name FXPepper. Not a single one.

What appears instead are third-party companies, different from one another and changing over time:

  • an instant transfer of 25,000 euros on 12 June 2026 in favour of a company named Swinetix Systems AG, with a Spanish IBAN at a Spanish payment institution;
  • a transfer on 13 July 2026 in favour of Avery Payments Ltd, at a Luxembourg bank specialising in payment services;
  • the first, small payment in favour of an Italian-sounding name — written on the payment instruction as "Acxtor Italy S.p.A." — which does not correspond to any entry in the Italian companies register. It should not be confused with genuinely existing companies whose names look similar and which have nothing to do with this matter.

We report these names because they appear on the receipts issued by the sending bank: they are documentary data, and we have no basis for stating what role any of those entities played. The point, however, does not depend on who they are: the money never went to the brand the victim believed she was dealing with, and it left Italy for payment institutions in three different countries.

The numbers on the screen, and the final bill

The appfxpepper.net dashboard showed an orderly, credible progression: 3,782 euros after the first payments, then 39,102, then 40,948, then 51,842, then 75,638. The final balance displayed was 131,923.79 euros.

In the meantime the decisive push had arrived: the supposed opening to small savers of units in a major aerospace project, with a deadline set for the following day. Two payments, 10,000 and 25,000 euros.

When she asked to withdraw, the script moved into the phase we know well: first the "fee" for the work done, then the claim that to unlock the capital she had to pay taxes in the United Kingdom, and finally a demand for 24,000 euros as a "necessary step".

She did not pay it. It is the only good news in this file, and it is not a small thing: that figure is the price many people pay for a balance that does not exist.

The documents handed over, and the damage nobody sees

The platform was given an identity card, a tax code, a facial recognition video and a utility bill. The bill was in a family member's name: which means that whoever runs appfxpepper.net also holds the personal details, tax code and address of a person who never had any dealings with the platform.

This is the damage nobody talks about, and it must be dealt with at once, by both people involved: a check in the credit risk registers, a review of the banking relationships opened in their names, and caution with every message arriving from self-styled recovery firms.

Did you pay money into appfxpepper.net or FXPepper? Contact us

If you operated on appfxpepper.net, on fxpepper.eu or on another address linked to the same brand, if you were asked to open an account at a digital bank and hand over the credentials, if you installed remote access software, or if you were told that to withdraw you must pay taxes abroad, you are facing the same scam we have already examined.

Do not pay any further money, on any pretext. Close the account opened on their instructions, obtain all the transfer receipts from your bank — they are the most important documents in the file — and keep the complete conversations, the dashboard screenshots and the telephone numbers used.

Fill in the form at the bottom of this page: we will review the material and tell you what can realistically be done, even when the site has already been blocked and the domains no longer respond.

Similar cases we have handled

Free case review

Do you need legal assistance?

Tell us about your case: free assessment, no obligation.

If you lost less than €5000 we cannot proceed · full confidentiality · no obligation.
Available now · 24 hours a day

Tell us about your case.
A lawyer replies — not a call centre.

Fill in the form: a lawyer from our firm assesses your case free of charge and tells you right away how we can help. Day or night, weekends included.