Please note: we are a law firm that deals exclusively with online fraud. If you would like help, you can contact us by filling in the form at the bottom of this article, and here you can see the cases we have resolved.
heurodigital.com is a scam: the fake e-money issuer born the day after the fake law firm
We have already handled this case. A person came to our firm after paying about seven thousand two hundred euros in 2026, believing she was recovering cryptocurrency she had bought on her own back in 2016.
The money was supposed to pass through an institution presented as an authorised electronic money issuer, reachable at heurodigital.com. She was given full banking details: an Italian IBAN, a BIC code and an account number.
Those details belong to no institution that could have issued them. heurodigital.com is a scam, and it is the second half of a scheme whose first half we described in another article.
What the site claims
The main page is in English and presents itself like this: a stablecoin pegged to the euro, issued by a French simplified joint-stock company, authorised as an electronic money institution by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution, the French supervisory authority.
The text goes on with the full apparatus of technical credibility: reserves one hundred per cent in cash and high-quality liquid assets held at EU-regulated credit institutions, one-to-one redeemability, monthly audits by an independent third-party firm, circulation on Ethereum and Solana.
It is well written because they did not write it.
heurodigital.com is a copy of a real site
We looked up the brand. A project with the same name exists, with its own site, whose domain has been registered since 24 June 2009: seventeen years of history, an ordinary United States registrar, the name servers of a large commercial provider.
The site our client was directed to, instead, is heurodigital.com, registered on 23 September 2026: two months before the events. The page title and the content are the same as the historic site's.
It is not an isolated case. Searching for the same brand, we found a small constellation of domains imitating it, and the registration dates tell of an industrial operation:
- two domains registered on the same day, 5 March 2026, with the same Hong Kong registrar, on the same pair of name servers;
- a third registered on 4 May 2026 with another registrar;
- heurodigital.com, on 23 September 2026, again with the Hong Kong registrar;
- at least one more under a different extension.
A brand cloned at least five times in a year, in waves, with batches of domains bought together. Anyone receiving one of these addresses has no way of knowing another four exist, all identical and all fake.
The link with the fake law firm
Here is the fact that closes the file on its own.
The same affair involves an English law firm that was supposed to be our client's representative in the recovery. Its site was registered on 22 September 2026.
heurodigital.com was registered on 23 September 2026: the day after.
The two domains share:
- the very same pair of name servers;
- the same email provider, a low-cost mailbox service.
The lawyer and the bank, bought together, configured together, over the same weekend. There is no legitimate scenario in which that happens.
Banking details that cannot exist
Our client was given an Italian IBAN, with a BIC code built on the brand name and an account number.
There is a contradiction here that needs no technical expertise to spot, and it is worth explaining because it recurs in many files.
The site declares itself a French company, authorised by a French authority. A French electronic money institution operates with French details. It cannot issue an Italian IBAN on its own bank code, because that code would be assigned to it in Italy, by another authority, after another authorisation.
Put another way: either the institution is French, or the IBAN is Italian. Not both.
Add the two checks anyone can do in five minutes, free of charge:
- the French register of authorised intermediaries is public: search the company name and see whether it exists, since when, and for which services;
- the website of a supervised institution always carries, in its legal pages, the authorisation number, the company register number and the address of its registered office. On heurodigital.com there is none of this: only the sentence declaring the authorisation.
A sentence is not an authorisation. It is a sentence.
The Bitcoin transaction shown as proof
One last element deserves a paragraph of its own, because it is the most elegant trick in the whole affair.
Our client was sent the link to a Bitcoin transaction on a public blockchain explorer, as a demonstration that the money existed and was moving.
That transaction is real. We checked it: it was recorded on 27 October 2026, it has a single input from a wallet holding about 2.5 bitcoin, and fourteen outputs, thirteen of them very small and one — by far the largest — returning to the sending address.
It is the typical shape of an automated batch payment: a wallet distributing many sums in a single operation and keeping the remainder.
The point, though, is another one, and it is why we are writing it:
- the blockchain is public, and anyone can send you the link to any transaction at all;
- a transaction shows addresses and amounts, it does not show names;
- the fact that it exists and can be verified says absolutely nothing about whether it concerns you.
Showing someone a real transaction, knowing they will check it and find it authentic, is one of the most effective ways of making them believe something false. If someone sends you such a link as proof of your money, the only question to ask is: which of these addresses would be mine, and how do you prove it?
What was handed over, and what to do at once
The platform was given an identity card, a tax code, an IBAN, a telephone number, proof of address, utility bills and a facial recognition video.
That is the complete package for opening banking or e-money relationships in somebody else's name. Anyone in the same position should, in this order: ask their bank for a check in the credit risk registers, keep a copy of everything they sent, and treat those documents as compromised.
Did you pay money into heurodigital.com? Contact us
If you were pointed to heurodigital.com as the institution to pay into, if you received an IBAN for an "electronic money issuer" you had never heard of, if you were told old cryptocurrency can be unblocked, or if you were sent a blockchain transaction link as proof, you are facing the same scam we have already examined.
Do not pay any more money and do not hand over any more documents. Obtain all the transfer receipts from your bank — they are the most important documents, because they carry the real payee's name, IBAN and bank — and keep the conversations exported in full, the emails with their complete headers and screenshots of the sites.
Fill in the form at the bottom of this page: we will review the material and tell you what can realistically be done.
Similar cases we have handled
- edwinstudio.uk: the fake London law firm built on a real firm's name
- quantumalphafx.com: the site is still online, and it dismantles itself
- epgicap.online: the fake support mailboxes had been ready for months
- cullinan-capital-limited.com: the payees on the transfers and the accounts opened in your name
- ehamarkets.com: the brand the FCA published a warning about
Do you need legal assistance?
Tell us about your case: free assessment, no obligation.
