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epgicap.online is a scam: the fake support mailboxes had been ready for months
We have already handled this case. A person came to our firm after losing about fifty thousand euros between February and September 2026 on a trading platform reachable at epgicap.online. He sent us twelve bank transfer receipts, sixteen screenshots of the transfers to his cryptocurrency wallets, and a written chronology of his own, detailed and well ordered.
Thanks to that chronology we were able to carry out a check that is possible in very few files: dating the infrastructure used to defraud him. The result is the reason this article exists, and it should be said at once: epgicap.online is a scam, and whoever built epgicap.online had set up the fake support mailboxes months before dialling his number.
Not one domain, but two
He remembers 19 February 2026 as the day of first contact: a WhatsApp message from a self-styled financial adviser, with a phone appointment the following day. At that appointment he was asked to register on a website and download the related app.
That first site was not epgicap.online: it was the same name under a different extension, epgicap.trade. The checks on the two domains tell a precise sequence:
- epgicap.trade was registered on 13 February 2026 with the United States registrar NameSilo. Six days before the first message. Today that domain is in "client hold" status: it has been suspended by the registrar, it no longer has delegated name servers and it no longer resolves.
- epgicap.online was registered through the same registrar on 23 March 2026, for one year, and placed on Cloudflare's name servers. epgicap.online is the domain the story continued on, and the one where he watched the numbers grow.
The main domain name has no address record: typing it opens nothing. The only entry point is a subdomain dedicated to the trading application, answering on an IP address not shielded by any masking service: the real server is exposed, it is hosted by a provider based in Asia, and the address's reverse name has no connection to the brand. The domain has no mail records: from epgicap.online you can neither receive nor send email.
The public certificate transparency logs show twenty entries, from 23 March 2026 — the day of registration — to 3 October 2026. After that date, nothing.
An independent technical analysis of epgicap.online, published last June by a consumer protection site, also noted that the certificate presented by the subdomain was self-signed, with the organisation field left at the default value of the software that generates it. It is the kind of detail any user could see, and that no authorised intermediary could afford.
No page of epgicap.online carries a company name, a registered office, a VAT number or a licence number.
The registration calendar
Here comes the part we consider most useful, and it only becomes visible when the dates are lined up.
In the final phase, when he asked to withdraw his money, he was told that anti-money-laundering checks were required. The messages came from three email addresses imitating well-known names in the sector: one built on the name of a large US exchange, one on the name of a second exchange, and a third with a technical, generic ring to it, referring to "blockchain management". All three on .network domains.
We checked those three domains. The picture is this:
- two of them were registered on the same day, 8 October 2025 — four months before this person received the first message;
- the third was registered on 9 February 2026: four days before epgicap.trade, and ten days before the first contact;
- all three are with the same registrar;
- all three have no website at all: no address record, nothing to visit;
- all three have active mail records, with the same email provider.
Three domains that host nothing and exist only to send email. This is the fact that demolishes the still widespread idea that there is an improviser behind these cases: the "phase two" infrastructure was ready and paid for months before the victim. The script provided from the outset that the withdrawal would never happen, and that a fake support desk would be there to explain why.
The route the money took, and why it was chosen
The way epgicap.online operated deserves to be described, because it repeats almost identically in many files.
He was asked to do three things, in this order: open a "foreign" account linked to his Italian one, pay in 250 euros to "activate" it and check everything worked, and install the app of a real, regulated cryptocurrency exchange, sharing some access codes.
From then on the money always followed the same route: a transfer from the Italian bank to the foreign account in his name, from the foreign account to the exchange, and from the exchange to a second exchange, "in order to take part in the operations". At every step the adviser guided him, and at every step he shared codes.
None of these steps, taken alone, sets off an alarm. That is exactly why they are requested in this order: each step moves the money further from the bank that could have stopped it, and all of them appear to have been ordered by the account holder.
In the first two or three weeks the dashboard showed a profit of about twelve thousand euros from a minimal deposit. That is the phase that convinces. Then came the proposal of the "jump": entering an investment system with higher returns, with profit simulations sent by message according to the amount paid in. He paid in another thirty-eight thousand euros, in repeated transfers. The dashboard went on to show over 130,000 dollars.
The invented taxes
The withdrawal request on epgicap.online opens the fees phase. They are worth listing, because they are all false and all presented as compulsory:
- a 10% commission on the profits, payable to the adviser;
- generic taxes owed "to the stock exchange and to the Italian State";
- a 6% commission to complete the anti-money-laundering checks, paid with two new transfers of five thousand and two thousand euros;
- finally, a notice that the profits would be subject to 18% taxation by the British tax authority.
No authorised intermediary asks a client to pay money in order to receive their own money. No tax authority, in any country, collects taxes by bank transfer to a private individual or in cryptocurrency. If someone asks you to, the answer is always the same: the fraud is continuing.
Then the adviser "fell ill", changed his phone number, and from July onwards stopped replying.
The second level: the fake recovery and the sixteen words
At the end of July a second person appeared. He said he could see, "through the blockchain", the 130,000 dollars blocked, and that he was there to unblock them. He had the victim fill in a form declaring he had been defrauded, asked for his identity card, and explained that the funds were on a different network from his account: a new wallet therefore had to be created.
And here he asked for the decisive thing: to copy the sixteen words of the new wallet.
This is the point on which we want to be as clear as possible, because the reader may face the same question tomorrow.
The sequence of words a wallet shows when it is created is the wallet. It is not a verification code, it is not a recoverable password, it is not registration data. Whoever holds it can rebuild the wallet on any device in the world and move everything it contains, at any time, without needing any further confirmation. No legitimate operator — no exchange, no authority, no support technician — ever asks for it, for any reason.
What followed was predictable. He was asked to "generate volume" of about eleven thousand dollars, with round trips between the two exchanges. On reaching the threshold, both the transfers of the previous days and the 130,000 dollars vanished from the wallet: the operation was carried out by someone else, towards an address that was not his.
If you have handed over a recovery phrase, treat that wallet as compromised for good: changing a password is not enough. A new wallet must be created, on a clean device, and whatever remains moved immediately.
The third level: the fake Europol
A few days ago the third phone call arrived. A person introduced himself as an officer of Europol, working on economic and financial crime investigations, and offered to help him report the matter and recover the money. Emails then arrived from a domain echoing the agency's name, and even a CV.
We checked that domain too: it was registered on 30 October 2026, that is a few days before the call, with a registrar different from the ones already seen.
Two things, said plainly:
- Europol does not telephone citizens and does not handle recovery files for individuals. It is the agency for cooperation between the police forces of the Member States: it receives information from national authorities, not from victims.
- A domain registered a few days before the call is, on its own, proof that the call does not come from an institution.
Anyone who has lost money on epgicap.online, or on any platform of this kind, gets contacted again. Almost always. Victims' data circulate between different groups, and the second and third approaches are often more polished than the first, because they already know everything about you: how much you lost, when, on which platform. The fact that the caller knows the details is not proof of legitimacy: it is proof of the opposite.
Did you pay money into epgicap.online? Contact us
If you operated on epgicap.online, on epgicap.trade or on a platform presented in the same way — an adviser on WhatsApp, a "foreign" account to open, an exchange to install, codes to share — you are facing the same scam we have already examined.
Do not pay any further money, for any reason. Do not pay unlocking fees and do not pay "taxes" to anyone. If you were asked for a recovery phrase, secure what is left immediately. And do not engage with anyone who contacts you promising recovery, including emails that appear to come from authorities.
Gather instead: all the transfer receipts, the statements of the foreign account, the complete transaction history on the exchanges, the conversations exported in full, the senders' email addresses with the complete message headers, and the telephone numbers used.
Fill in the form at the bottom of this page: we will review the material and tell you what can realistically be done.
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