We have already handled this case: 7,650 euro in transfers and cryptocurrency, and a remote assistance program used to open a bank account in the victim's name. We can help anyone caught by the same scam: fill in the form at the bottom of this page.
Please note: we are a law firm and we deal exclusively with online fraud cases. If you have fallen into the same trap and want help, you can contact us by filling in the form at the bottom of this article.
We have already handled this case and we can assist anyone who has been caught by it. studnest.com is a scam: we write this on the basis of the file of one of our clients, who paid out 7,650 euro through Italian bank transfers, foreign transfers and cryptocurrency. The worst part of this story, however, is not the money. It is that at a certain point they had him install a remote assistance program on his computer. And after that session a bank account had been opened in his name.
A lorry driver, 7,650 euro and a support service that was not support
Our client is a lorry driver: he works long hours, often far from home, and he started using studnest.com in August 2026. The first payments were transfers to Italian accounts. Then came the transfers abroad. Then the cryptocurrency transfers, to wallets indicated each time by the site's support service. In total 7,650 euro, with the last movements dating back only a few weeks. He handed over his name, his IBAN and his telephone number.
He has not yet filed a criminal complaint and he is still in contact with the studnest.com support service. This is exactly the condition most people are in when they reach us: not because they are naive, but because as long as the chat is open the hope of seeing the money again is open too, and the people on the other side know this perfectly well.
When we reconstructed the chronology with him, the step that changes the legal classification of the whole affair emerged: in order to unblock an operation he was asked to install a remote assistance program and to let an operator drive the computer in his place. After that session there was an account in his name that he had never opened.
The checks on the studnest.com domain
Before writing that studnest.com is a scam we carried out the checks we always carry out, and we set them out in full because anyone can repeat them.
The studnest.com domain has been registered since 31 July 2024 with a large United States retail registrar, with renewal running to 2027 and the registration data last modified on 1 July 2026. The nameservers belong to a major proxy and CDN service: the practical effect is that the address of the real server, and therefore the country where the site is actually hosted, are not visible from outside. The domain's mail runs through Google Workspace and, among the DNS records, two distinct Google verification codes appear: two different accounts have claimed control of the same domain.
The site, for anyone trying to open it, replies with an automated verification screen that filters incoming requests. We did not bypass it and we say so openly: we have not read the internal pages. What matters, however, is what is missing from the documents our client received over months of dealings. There is no company name. There is no VAT number and no company register number. There is no verifiable address. There is no licence number and no name of a supervisory authority.
A platform that collects money from the public and does not state who it is, is not simply an operator short on transparency: it is a party operating outside the law. In Italy, providing investment services without authorisation is punished by article 166 of the Consolidated Law on Finance, and the Court of Cassation has made clear that the offence is complete as soon as funds are collected, regardless of whether the money is then actually invested anywhere.
It is worth adding a second element, because it recurs in every file of this kind: the stated profit percentages. No authorised intermediary can promise a return, because nobody knows in advance how the markets will move. When a platform displays a share of winning trades close to one hundred per cent, it is not describing a result: it is describing an interface that somebody controls from the other side of the screen.
What the person who enters your screen actually sees
Here we come to the heart of the matter, and it is the reason we chose to tell this particular case. When somebody installs a remote assistance program and authorises the session, the person on the other side does not see the platform page. They see the computer.
They see the online banking, if it is open in a tab. They see the text messages, if the phone is synchronised with the computer, and therefore the one-time codes the bank sends to authorise operations. They see the documents and photographs saved in the folders, identity card included. They see the passwords stored in the browser, which can be read in plain text in a few steps. They see the email and can create a rule inside it that silently forwards elsewhere or deletes the bank's messages, so that later communications never reach the account holder's eyes. And they can upload and download files.
This is not technical support. It is the key to the house, handed to somebody who was asking for it for exactly that reason.
Anyone searching for studnest.com on a search engine usually does so to find out whether the money can still be recovered. In a case like this the right question comes first, and it is a different one: what did they do with my device while they were controlling it.
The account opened in his name is the most dangerous part
Opening a bank account or an account on an exchange using another person's data amounts to impersonation under article 494 of the Italian criminal code. If, in order to do so, data, information or programs in a computer system are interfered with without right, obtaining an unjust profit at another's expense, this constitutes computer fraud under article 640-ter. Entry into the device may also amount to unauthorised access to a computer system under article 615-ter: the Court of Cassation has held that access remains unauthorised even when carried out by somebody who had been authorised, if that person acts for purposes extraneous to those for which the authorisation was granted. That is precisely what happens when the studnest.com support service asks to come in to unblock a withdrawal and instead opens a bank account.
The most serious risk for the person who goes through this, however, is a different one, and it is run without knowing it. An account opened in the name of an unwitting person almost always serves to move other victims' money. The apparent holder becomes the recipient of transfers he never asked for and the name that appears in other people's complaints. In Italy this opens the door to a charge of money laundering or reinvestment of criminal proceeds, articles 648-bis and 648-ter.1 of the criminal code, against the person who, on paper, opened that account. It can be defended against, and in our experience defended well: we followed a case closed with recognition of the account holder's good faith. But defending it requires two things: documenting that the account was not opened by him, and moving before other people write that name into their own case files.
Why studnest.com is a scam and not an investment that went badly
People who have paid money to studnest.com are often told, even by those close to them, that they simply made a bad investment. That is not the case, and the distinction has very concrete procedural consequences.
A bad investment is one where an authorised intermediary executes the order you gave and the market moves the other way: the money exists, it was genuinely deployed and it was lost. Nothing of the sort happened here. Here there is a false representation — a platform presenting itself as a financial operator without being one, figures on a screen matching no real position, a support service asking for access to the device on a pretext — and that representation induced a person to part with his money. These are the artifices and deceptions of article 640 of the Italian criminal code, with the error induced and the financial loss that followed. That is why studnest.com is a scam in the technical sense of the word, and not bad luck.
Almost all these files also feature the aggravating circumstance of diminished defence, article 61 no. 5 of the criminal code: the victim is approached remotely, kept inside a chat, isolated from anyone who might point out the anomaly, and pressed at times and at a pace chosen by the perpetrators. This is not a textbook detail: that aggravating circumstance makes the offence prosecutable of the court's own motion, so the proceedings do not hang on the victim's wishes and the public prosecutor can proceed in any event.
Finally there is the question of the money. Where the perpetrators have a name and attachable assets, alongside the criminal proceedings it is possible to apply for the protective seizure provided by article 316 of the code of criminal procedure, to tie up the assets before they disappear. And if the proceedings are dismissed too quickly, there remains the opposition to dismissal under article 410: twenty days, on condition that the complaint stated that the victim wished to be informed of any request for dismissal. It is a single line that almost nobody writes and that changes everything.
What to do straight away, in order
If you have had a remote assistance session with studnest.com, these steps come before everything else.
Change your passwords from another device, not from the one the session took place on. Revoke all active sessions on email, online banking and exchanges. Check your mailbox for forwarding and automatic deletion rules, because that is where the long-term damage hides. Check your online banking for saved beneficiaries, standing orders and operating limits. Uninstall the remote assistance program and treat that computer as compromised. Notify the bank in writing, not only by telephone. Keep everything: chats, emails, transfer receipts, screenshots of the platform, bank statements, the addresses of the wallets you sent cryptocurrency to. Then file a criminal complaint.
One specific point on bank transfers: Regulation (EU) 2024/886 requires European banks to verify that the beneficiary's name matches the IBAN given. If a transfer was executed to a beneficiary whose name did not match, that is a point to raise with the institution, and it must be raised in writing.
Other cases we have handled
The scheme changes its name and stays the same: studnest.com is a scam that repeats steps we already know. We have written about a platform that wrote its own excuses for not paying inside the app's code, a fake online job built on a famous trademark used as a subdomain, the case of a man blocked by his bank and by the exchange who later realised they had been right, a clone of a genuinely authorised firm, flagged by the British supervisory authority and a case in which the fake refund was requested in gift cards.
If it has happened to you too
If you have recognised in this account what happened to you or to someone in your family, do not wait for the chat with studnest.com to close by itself. In these affairs time works against the person who paid the money and in favour of the person who received it.
Fill in the form at the bottom of this page: you will tell us what happened, how much you paid and by what means, and we will tell you what can be done, how long it takes and what it costs. Our firm deals exclusively with online fraud, we have already handled a case in which studnest.com is a scam documented inside a file, and that allows us to move immediately without starting from scratch.
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